

Breaking Trust: Shades of Crisis Across an Insecure Software Supply Chain

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Why software supply chains?

Software Channels Scale


We Don't Build What We Use

Supply Chain (in)Security




A decade of attacks and disclosures in the software supply chain


117 attacks & 44 disclosures




Attacks on open source with repeated targeting of NPM and PyPi




At least 32 attacks from state actors, most notably Russia and China



24% of attacks target app stores and developer tools



25% of attacks hit software updates



Key Trends

Efficiency and Scale

Path to Targeted Exploitation

Subverting Vendor Code-Signing

Targeting OSS Repositories


Sunburst



ACCOUNT
ACCESS



History Rhymes



What Comes Next?



Better Defense of OSS

Risk Assessment on New Data

Don't Forget About Architecture

Thank you

For more on this project visit:
<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/breaking-trust/>

Recommendations

Ready for Work 0

These recommendations build on existing authorities, functions, or programs but may require new funding.

1. Hunt for Blast Radius
2. FASC Sets the Process
4. Shift the Landscape for Adversaries
6. Give SBOM a Glide Path to Success
8. Do Not Leave Open Source Behind
10. Create a Trusted Traveler Program for FedRAMP
11. Evolve and Default to Secure

1 Some assembly required

These ideas pair an action with an outcome or actor but may have a critical dependency that keeps them from being shovel ready.

5. Develop a Lifecycle Security Overlay
7. Apply the Overlay
12. Govern Through the Cloud

2 Step Carefully

Ideas to push outside the box a bit farther while still being rooted in critical needs

3. Breach Response Hunger Games
9. Change an Architecture, Change the World



Selected Recommendations

Ruthlessly Prioritize Risk

1. Hunt for blast radius

Improve the Defensibility of Linchpin Technologies

5. Develop a lifecycle security overlay
8. Do not leave open source behind
9. Change the architecture, change the world

Enhance the Adaptability of Federal Cyber Risk Management

12. Govern through the cloud

