Breaking Trust:

Shades of Crisis Across an Insecure Software Supply Chain

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Why software supply chains?

Software Channels Scale

We Don't Build What We Use


Supply Chain (in)Security





A decade of attacks and disclosures in the software supply chain

117 attacks & 44 disclosures




ATTACK VECTOR

XXXXXX




Attacks on open source with repeated targeting of NPM and PyPi






At least 32 attacks from state actors, most notably Russia and China









@CyberStatecraft ATTACK VECTOR $\times \times \times \times \times \times$ XXXXXX **ACOUNT ACCESS** COMPROMISED 32 **SDKS** XXXXX IN OPEN SOURCE 28 XXXXX REPOSITORIES IN APP STORES XXXXXXXXXX XXXX USER DOWNLOAD VECTOR DEVELOPMENT MALWARE DEPENDENCIES 25% of attacks hit MALWARE MALWARE **EMBEDDED** INSERTED **EMBEDDED TYPOSQUATTING** software updates DEVELOPMENT **PROCESS UPDATES AND** SYSTEM DESIGN **IMPLEMENTATION ITERATIVE TESTING** DEPLOYMENT MAINTENANCE 28 ATTACKER-MADE SOFTWARE · Certificate theft · Credential theft XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX · Flawed cryptography XXXXXXXX Default hardcoded password · Firmware editing XXXXXXX Code injection I ATTACK VECTORS Presignature Insertion 2 XXXXXXXX

XXXXXXX Stolen Certificates 17

XXXXX Self or Unsigned 6

XXXXXXXXXXXAccount Access 17
XXXXXXXXFlawed Cryptography 7

KEY

COMPROMISED SOFTWARE

TYPICALLY BENIGN -








Efficiency and Scale


Path to Targeted Exploitation

Subverting Vendor Code-Signing

Targeting OSS Repositories













Better Defense of OSS

Risk Assessment on New Data

Don't Forget About Architecture





Thank you

For more on this project visit: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/breaking-trust/



@CyberStatecraft Recommendations Ready for Work 0 These recommendations build on existing authorities, functions, or programs but may require new funding. 1. Hunt for Blast Radius 2. FASC Sets the Process 4. Shift the Landscape for **Adversaries** 6. Give SBOM a Glide Path to Success 8. Do Not Leave Open Source Behind 10. Create a Trusted Traveler Program for FedRAMP 11. Evolve and Default to Secure **Atlantic Counc**

Some assembly required


These ideas pair an action with an outcome or actor but may have a critical dependency that keeps them from being shovel ready.

- 5. Develop a Lifecycle Security Overlay
- 7. Apply the Overlay
- 12. Govern Through the Cloud

Step Carefully

Ideas to push outside the box a bit farther while still being rooted in critical needs

- 3. Breach Response Hunger Games
- Change an Architecture, Change the World



Ruthlessly Prioritize Risk

1. Hunt for blast radius

Improve the Defensibility of Linchpin Technologies

- 5. Develop a lifecycle security overlay
- 8. Do not leave open source behind
- 9. Change the architecture, change the world

Enhance the Adaptability of Federal Cyber Risk Management

12. Govern through the cloud